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Abstract 
 
In 1882 the Qing dynasty government established the Xing’an garrison in Heilongjiang to 
counteract the impact of Russian exploration and territorial expansion into the region. 
The Xing’an garrison was only operative for twelve years before closing down. What 
may seem to be an unmitigated failure of military and civil administrative planning was 
in fact a decisive attempt to contend with the challenges of governing borderland people 
rather than merely shoring up physical territorial limits. The Xing’an garrison arose out 
of the need to “draw in” the Yafahan Orochen population, one that had developed close 
relations with Russians through trade and social interaction. This article demonstrates that 
while building a garrison did not achieve the intended goal of strengthening control over 
the Yafahan Orochen, it was one of several measures the Qing employed to shape the 
human frontier in this critical borderland. 
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Introduction 
 
 In 1882, the Heilongjiang general’s yamen began setting up a new garrison. This 
milestone was distinctive because 150 years had passed since the last two were 
established, which had brought the actual total of garrisons within Heilongjiang to six..  
The new Xing’an garrison (Xing’an cheng 興安城) would not be the last one built before 
the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) but it was notably short-lived, in operation for 
only twelve years before being dismantled. Its ephemeral existence was nevertheless 
significant because it was a solution and pre-emptive response to problems both real and 
anticipated immediately during its establishment and in several decades before and after. 
Its erection was moreover one of several strategies the Qing pursued to contend with the 
inherent instability of a physical border and the people living in the frontier zone 
comprised of territory adjoining both sides of the border.1    
 The border in question demarcated the northeastern and southeastern limits 
respectively of the Qing and Tsarist Russian (1547-1917) domains that had been the 
principal concerns of their diplomatic relations in the preceding three centuries. The two 
states clarified and revised their mutual understandings of this boundary between them 
through several cycles of military conflict, diplomatic negotiation, and legal resolution. 
But their common border held different if equally justifiable meanings for the two 
                                                     
1 In this article, the term “borderland” refers to the physical land adjacent to a legal border, and 
“frontier” is the political-economic-social zone in which people in a borderland were active but 
which is not associated with a particular geographic space. 
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empires. Expansion was the prime objective for the Tsarist Russian side. Acquiring more 
territory and subjects was a perpetual mission, occurring in varying forms over time.2 
From open military conquest in the seventeenth century to the de facto claims on land 
and natural resources by civilian settlements in the nineteenth, Tsarist Russian 
governments attempted to expand their reach ever southward. Qing rulers, on the other 
hand, were primarily interested in maintaining a stable and secure border. For the most 
part, they did not mirror their Russian counterparts’ ambition by striving to adjust the 
border in a northward direction.3 Instead, they concentrated on defending the geographic 
and political limits of their domain as defined by successive treaties. These descriptions 
are not meant to imply that these conflicting visions of the border, as a line to be crossed 
and redrawn from the Russian perspective and as a firm physical and legal barrier 
delimiting sovereignty over land and people from the Qing view, should be compared or 
judged against each other. Rather than reaching subjective conclusions about Russian 
“aggression” or Chinese “passivity,” what matters more from both military and political 
standpoints is that these divergent approaches to managing the border generated continual 
tension between the two states and complicated other aspects of their relations such as 
trade and cultural exchange.  
 Ongoing contention over the border was problematic not only for inter-state 
relations but for the administration of adjacent territory. The border, despite all efforts to 
mark and fortify it, was not an absolute partition of space and society. People and goods 
                                                     
2 See Brower and Lazzerini 1997, and Khodarkovsky 2004. 
3 This interpretation is more prevalent in common references to the Qing dynasty’s commitment 
to maintaining the border, particularly in Chinese-language scholarship, rather than in explicit 
arguments that the Qing did not have any ambition to take over Siberia or Central Asia. The very 
fact that the Qing did not launch military campaigns in those parts of Russia may also speak for 
itself.  
  
4 
4 
moved from one side to another with and without official sanction. Borderland 
inhabitants forged economic and social ties that sometimes compromised their political 
identities as subjects of different imperial governments. They prioritized their livelihoods 
and kinship relations over laws and mechanisms of border control that dictated what their 
physical positions and communal identities should be. Therefore, the first principle of 
borderland administration was that regulating people’s movements in both directions 
across a border was equally important. In other words, keeping people within one’s 
territory was just as significant and difficult as keeping people out of it.4 Another concept 
especially salient to this study is that borderlands did not disappear with the 
establishment of borders, but could be pliable and therefore manipulated according to 
varying circumstances. As many scholars of both China and other regions have argued, 
frontiers were zones that transcended linear borders. Even the most powerful government, 
equipped with ample material and human resources, could manage the physical frontier 
of a borderland by marking it with symbols of its authority and inspecting it with 
surveillance technology. It could not, however, eradicate or even comprehensively 
regulate cultural and social frontiers, which were arenas of human interaction upon which 
no concrete spatial and political limits could be imposed.5  
 The plasticity of frontiers was normally a liability from a borderland 
administrator’s perspective, but it proved to be useful for both sides in the mid to late 
nineteenth century when the official border between Siberia and Manchuria became 
subject to re-interpretation. Tsarist Russia pursued a second wave of interest in territorial 
expansion by sending expeditions to navigate Manchuria’s waterways, building 
                                                     
4 Although now often taken for granted, this point has been paradigmatically articulated about 
erecting and maintaining China’s Great Wall in Waldron 1990. 
5 Lattimore 1940. 
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infrastructure such as bridges, and settling migrant populations on Manchurian soil. 
Diplomatic agreements such as the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Convention of 
Beijing formally substantiated Russian gains achieved by these strategies. In the wake of 
this multi-pronged advance, strengthening control over the actual border was not enough 
and was ultimately a losing battle. The Qing succeeded in Heilongjiang, the 
administrative region of Manchuria immediately adjoining the border with Siberia, in 
manipulating a human frontier consisting of a native tribal population known as the 
Yafahan Orochen (Yafahan Elunchun 雅發罕鄂(俄)倫春).6 The process of “drawing in” 
(shoulong收攏) these people occurred in multiple stages from 1855 to 1905 and consisted 
of measures to change their geographical position so that they would be less able and 
likely to interact with Russians and to channel their manpower into the regional defense 
force.7 I argue that these measures, including the establishment of the Xing’an garrison, 
were critical military strategies for two reasons. First, they were imperative defensive 
tactics, because the Yafahan Orochen lived in areas that were most vulnerable to Russian 
infiltration and occupation. Secondly, they largely pre-empted Yafahan Orochen 
conscription into the imperial Russian military or exploitation in extracting Manchuria’s 
natural resources. Moreover, this case study shows that while the Qing state literally lost 
                                                     
6 The Orochen went by many names during and after the Qing, and “Orochen” is one of several 
English translations of the native term “Orcien” that was transliterated in multiple combinations 
of Chinese characters (俄爾吞 / 俄羅春 / 俄樂春 / 俄倫春 / 鄂倫春). Pinpointing the Orochen in 
Qing government documents is additionally difficult because certain Orochen sub-groups were 
identified as being non-Orochen because the people in question identified themselves by clan or 
place-based names. 
7 Italicized terms in parentheses are Chinese unless otherwise identified as “Ma.” (Manchu) or 
“Ru.” (Russian). In cases of two terms in different languages stated together, Chinese vocabulary 
will be marked as “Ch.” A Manchu term will only be mentioned for a given concept if the 
Chinese term was derived from it.  
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ground progressively in Manchuria during the nineteenth century, it invested 
considerable and fruitful effort in consolidating control over people like the Yafahan 
Orochen who determined the actual parameters of political authority. The value of such 
decisive actions can only be fully appreciated through the counterfactual supposition that 
they had not been taken, in which case Heilongjiang might have become Russian territory 
during the nineteenth century. 
 The decades-long process of “drawing in” the Yafahan Orochen was neither 
simple nor straightforward, as will be seen in this article. Increasing control over their 
activities posed many challenges to the imperial center and Heilongjiang officials. The 
Yafahan Orochen in turn resented the new constraints on their former autonomy and 
resisted various measures to ensure that they remained in body and soul within the 
bounds of the Qing state. Problems of guaranteeing their livelihood and preventing them 
from retreating to areas where they could avoid the state’s surveillance compelled 
officials to devise and implement several different strategies. The first section will 
introduce the background of this case, describing how Heilongjiang was one of the 
Qing’s “special administrative regions,” whereas tribute and military organization were 
two means of harnessing the human frontier from the mid-seventeenth century onward. 
The second section will outline the circumstances in the nineteenth century that sparked 
official concerns about the Yafahan Orochen’s physical position. The third part will 
discuss how military exercises and other techniques of periodic monitoring were 
inadequate, leading to the brief life of the Xing’an garrison described in the fourth section. 
The fifth and final part, followed by a separate conclusion, analyzes how the “drawing 
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in” of the Yafahan Orochen was assessed within decades and nearly a full century after it 
occurred. 
 
Fit for Purpose Management of Borderlands  
 
 Building a new garrison as a means of strengthening control over one indigenous 
population may seem like an extreme measure, especially considering the requisite 
physical, financial, and human resources. In Heilongjiang, however, this development 
was consonant with the overall strategy the Qing had honed to articulate its sovereignty 
in the region and derive maximum benefits from the area’s enduring characteristic as a 
frontier where a diverse population existed and where the imperial state had near 
monopolistic control over natural resources. Quite unlike preceding regimes that 
attempted to manage frontiers through appeasement of peoples living in and around them 
through trade and gift-giving or the construction of physical structures to deter their 
movement, such as the Great Wall, the Qing pursued two general strategies to administer 
its peripheral zones.8  
 The long-standing political tradition of making peace with indigenous peoples by 
granting them economic and social autonomy was the Qing modus operandi on the 
southern and western frontiers until the mid-eighteenth century.9 While non-Han natives 
of the southern borderlands were obligated to display nominal obeisance to the ruling 
Chinese imperial state, they exercised considerable agency in distributing resources and 
                                                     
8 Frontier peoples as “barbarians” (yi 夷) who needed to be pacified is a running theme in 
statecraft throughout China’s imperial age. See Barfield 1989 and Fiskesjö 1999. 
9 Giersch 2006 and Herman 2007. 
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handling social relations within their groups according to customary law. Leaders of 
these populations solidified their power and influence by accepting imperial 
appointments and serving as civil and military officials.10 They managed tribute and tax 
collection as well as conscription of laborers for official projects in Yunnan, Guizhou, 
Guangxi, Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet. Starting in the early eighteenth century, 
the Qing center pared down autonomy in a process known as gaitu guiliu改土歸流 
(replacing indigenous officials with imperial bureaucrats), which converted many of the 
native political and social units to fit them into the standard administrative structure for 
the Chinese heartland.11 
 In its northern borderlands, the Qing center used militarization to assert its 
authority over the indigenous populations.12 It co-opted Mongol leaders through 
intermarrying and granting autonomy as awarded to southern indigenous elites, but also 
did so by organizing Mongol tribes into banners (qi旗), which were military and 
administrative divisions that the Qing founding fathers had created to muster manpower 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.13 The “new frontier” of Xinjiang, decisively 
incorporated into the Qing domain during the mid-eighteenth century, would also be 
subject to military administration by a cadre of military officials leading troops brought 
in from other regions, unlike in Mongolia where bureaucrats largely governed their own 
groups. In Qing Manchuria, roughly equivalent to what is now known as Northeastern 
China, the highest officials were generals (jiangjun將軍) but were not only in charge of 
                                                     
10 Gong 1992. 
11 See Wu 1988, 251-65. 
12 See Di Cosmo 1998. 
13 Legrand 1976, particularly pages 148-87, and Sanjdorj 1980. 
  
9 
9 
borderland defense but all matters of civil concern. Their ability to perform both military 
and civil functions was vital because the management of concrete territorial boundaries 
and the porous ones between “foreign” and “native” peoples was equally important. 
 Creating these conjoint positions was especially rational given the evolution of 
Manchuria as a political region. Cossacks conquering Manchuria in the name of the tsar 
gained the attention of the Shunzhi (r. 1644-1661) and Kangxi (r.1661-1722) emperors 
because of people rather than land. The early Qing state was already preoccupied with the 
customary business of establishing its position as the imperial government of China and 
faced numerous pressing threats from its own subjects, such as the leaders of the Three 
Feudatories, and from foreigners of a known quantity such as the Dzungars (Zhunga’er 
準噶爾), both of which threatened its very ability to rule. The “Russians” (Luocha羅剎), 
as people coming from Siberia were labeled collectively, were comparatively small fry in 
the pool of enemies. Nevertheless, their exploration of the middle and lower reaches of 
the Amur River became increasingly worrisome.14 Early efforts to repel their incursions 
involved indigenous tribes that launched their own defensive campaigns, the Qing official 
troops (Eight Banners, Baqi八旗), and foreign allies such as the 1654-1658 Chosŏn 
“northern expeditions (Ko. Nasŏn chŏngbŏl 羅禪征伐).”15 Through these campaigns, 
Qing officials learned more about Russian tactics of demanding tribute (Ru. iasak) from 
Manchurian indigenes, a practice that was not only lucrative but also politically 
                                                     
14 The Tsarist state started to gather intelligence about the wealth of resources in the Amur River 
region from 1636, the first year of Hong Taiji’s reign as the Chongde emperor. It dispatched two 
expeditions to survey the area in 1636 and 1641. Subsequent missions in 1646 and 1653 were 
fully armed, covered more ground, and invaded villages of native populations such as the Dagur.  
15 For the most recent comprehensive analysis of these campaigns’ impact on both Qing-Russian 
relations and Chosŏn military development, see Kang 2013. 
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meaningful because paying tribute signified loyalty to the tsar. Some native populations 
initially agreed to tribute, interpreting it as a form of trade, while others resisted what 
they considered to be unreasonable or unfavorable demands. Groups that either refused or 
changed their minds after agreeing to tribute faced violent consequences. The Russians 
committed arson, rape, plundering, and murder to coerce and punish Manchurian 
indigenes, as in 1683 when a group of twenty indigenous huntsmen was lured into a 
house that was then set on fire, killing all of the victims.16  
 Similar incidents occurred with such frequency that the Qing court realized 
military action was insufficient to thwart Russian attempts to take over territory through 
political and economic conscription. In 1686, after Qing troops defeated and destroyed 
the Russian fort of Albazin, which had been built on the grounds of Yagsi (Yakesa 雅克
薩), a Dagur (Dawo’er 達呼爾 / 達斡爾) city, the Qing center finally convinced the 
Tsarist state to engage in diplomatic discussion rather than continuing their dispute 
through combat. Negotiations to end military confrontation led to the solution of 
delineating not only land but also people in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Russian houses 
on the southern (Qing) side of the border had to be moved to the northern (Russian) one. 
Hunters could not cross the border to pursue game animals without permission. And 
                                                     
16 KX22.09.09 (October 28, 1693). QSL-SZ 112:4b-6a. Note that texts will be cited in one of two 
ways, as fascicle and page (X:Y) if the document in question is organized according to traditional 
Chinese binding and pagination, and fascicle and page (X/Y) if it is printed in fascicles but the 
pagination is in the modern style, or continuous throughout a bound volume. 
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perhaps most importantly, people had to accept their political identities as Russian or 
Qing subjects based on where they lived.17  
 The Treaty was a turning point in Qing-Russian relations but was at best one of 
many catalysts in the development of two institutions that had been set in motion earlier 
in Manchuria. The first is the tribute system, which was just like what the Tsarist Russian 
state attempted to impose upon Manchurians. Economic obligation and political identity 
were directly linked together through this institution. Tribute was not about actually 
paying respect to the emperor in person, as was the centerpiece of tribute offered by 
foreign missions to the Qing, but was the harvesting of natural resources based on a 
standard schedule and set quotas. This practice had started during the Later Jin (1616-
1636), when Jurchen rulers demanded obeisance from neighboring tribes by receiving 
their leaders as tributaries and remunerating them with foodstuffs and other goods styled 
as “gifts” (Ch. wulin烏綾 / 烏林, Ma. ulin). After the establishment of the Qing, tribute 
became compulsory for all Manchurian peoples, with punitive measures applied to 
groups refusing to participate.   
 The second method of cementing the natives’ political loyalty was military 
conscription. This approach was important because instead of bringing in soldiers from 
outside, the Qing mustered manpower from the region to defend it. Qing officials 
organized indigenous peoples into military units and moved them around the region 
according to tactical needs.18 Some of these forces were eventually sent out to other 
                                                     
17 This clause prevented people from changing their allegiance from one state to another at will, a 
practice that had caused many disputes about the extradition of individuals and groups for several 
decades before the Treaty. 
18 For the processes of directed migration and enrollment of Manchurian tribes into the Eight 
Banners, see Liu 1998. This strategy of employing “local talent” was manifested in various ways, 
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places in the empire, whether for specific and finite campaigns, or to be permanently 
resettled, such as the Xibe (Xibo 錫伯) and Solon (Suolun 索倫) peoples in Xinjiang. The 
Qing even exploited the physical strength of Manchurian populations not formally 
employed as soldiers, and they performed menial labor such as fetching water and 
harvesting timber for the supervising offices. Regional authorities held month-long 
military training periods during the spring and autumn for a certain number of able-
bodied, mature males chosen from these groups. These month-long camps also taught 
agricultural and husbandry skills that participants used for officially mandated and 
private economic activities.  
 In Heilongjiang, tribute and military service went hand in hand for most of 
Manchuria’s non-Manchu and non-Mongol populations. The dual obligation to fill the 
Qing’s state coffers and ensure its security was most obvious in the functions of the 
Butha division of the Heilongjiang Eight Banners.19 Besides training and being prepared 
                                                                                                                                                              
such as “proficient archers and tiger-killers” being enrolled in firearm battalions during the 
Kangxi reign. See QSG 130/3863. 
 
19 The administration of the first Heilongjiang general Sabsu (Sabusu 薩布素) took over 
responsibility for the hunting tribes (Ch. buteha dasheng buluo 布特哈打牲部落, Ma. butha 
niyalma-i aiman) comprising the Butha banners, formerly under the jurisdiction of the Court for 
Colonial Dependencies (Ch. lifanyuan 理藩院, Ma. tulergi golo be dasara jurgan). The Butha 
banners consisted primarily of the Solon and Dagur peoples that had moved southward into the 
Nen River (Nen jiang嫩江) area during the Shunzhi reign. The term “Butha” referred to their 
traditional occupations of hunting and fishing. In the first phase of organizing the Butha division, 
from 1684 to 1692, the Heilongjiang general assigned 2,340 troops into 39 Solon and Dagur 
companies, which were then distributed into the Eight Banners. These soldiers were deployed to 
the area garrisons and outside of Heilongjiang to participate in battles within the Chinese 
heartland as well as other borderlands. Later, during the Yongzheng reign, 6,661 able-bodied 
Butha men, including Dagur, Solon, and Heje (Hezhe赫哲), were conscripted into 108 
companies, each consisting of men sharing clan or tribal ties. The Butha banners had their own 
leadership hierarchy in which Manchu commandants and vice-commandants were initially 
appointed to train the forces, but who were gradually replaced with officials from these groups to 
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to fight foreign enemies and assist in regional law enforcement, the Butha banners were 
also expected to hunt for commodities (mainly fur pelts) as a regular duty. Soldiers in the 
Butha banners also maintained their traditional livelihoods of hunting and fishing to feed 
their families since they did not have designated sources of income such as banner lands 
that could be cultivated or rented out to tenant farmers. This system, subject to periodic 
and situational adjustments, stabilized by the end of the Yongzheng reign (1722-1735) 
and functioned until nearly the end of the dynasty. The standard composition of the Butha 
banners from 1725 onward is given in Figure 1.20  
  
 [Figure 1 here]  
  
 The Orochen were one of the populations in the Butha banners that the  Later Jin 
and later the Qing co-opted into the Manchus’ tribute and regional defense systems. The 
Nerchinsk border settlement divided them from their co-ethnics in Russian territory (Ru. 
Orochony). The Orochen were different from other Manchurian populations, however, 
because they were divided into two sub-groups. One was the Moringga (Moling’a  摩(墨)
凌阿), the Manchu term meaning mounted on horse, who were official troops that 
received monetary and material compensation accordingly.21 Like other bannermen, they 
                                                                                                                                                              
lead ethnically homogeneous units. Moreover, since these troops were charged with harvesting 
indigenous produce such as the aforementioned sable pelts, they worked together not only as 
combat and routine defense units but as members of hunting and gathering collectives and as 
agricultural work teams. 
20 QHWT 182:47a; QHTD 70:17a; QBTZ 35:17a; QSG 130/3867-68. 
21 Official [standing (jingzhi bing經制兵), or standard (zhenggui bing正規兵)] troops included 
the Eight Banners and Green Standard (lüying bing綠營兵) forces. 
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were organized into companies (Ch. niulu牛祿, Ma. niru), led by captains and lieutenants. 
The Yafahan, the Manchu term meaning pedestrian or literally “on foot,” were only 
responsible for meeting semi-annual quotas of sable pelt tribute, for which they earned 
cloth and other items that they could not acquire through their principal economic 
practices of hunting and fishing.22 These Orochen were organized into five routes, each 
supervised by Dagur or Solon banner officials known as anda who served three-year 
terms.23 Anda collected tribute items from the populations to which they were assigned 
and monitored their living conditions. Three of the routes centered around their 
eponymous rivers: the Ali route around the Ali River阿里河, the Dubukur route around 
the Dubukur River (Duobuku’er He 多布庫爾河), and the Tuo route around the Tuo 
River托河.24 The other two routes were also based on rivers, the Kumar (Kuma’er 庫瑪
爾) route around the Huma River (Huma’er He 呼瑪爾河) and its tributaries, the Kun 坤
河and Fabiela 法別拉河Rivers, and the Birar (Bila’er 畢拉爾) route encompassed the 
Xun 遜河, Zhan 沾河, Wuyun 烏雲河 and Jiameng  嘉萌河 Rivers.  
 In the absence of a proverbial “smoking gun,” or singular explanation straight 
from a government document about why the Orochen were divided into two groups, 
several hypotheses related to logistics may be brought to mind. The first is that the costs 
                                                     
22 In certain documents the Manchu terms Moringga and Yafahan were replaced by the respective 
descriptions of their primary work animals, “horse-raising” and “deer-raising,” as seen in figure 1. 
See QBTZ 35:17a-b, QCWT 271:27b and 294:54a, and QHTD 97:5b. 
23 Anda 安達 / 諳達 is a Manchu term meaning “close friend” or “guest.”  
24 Pinyin in parentheses will only be given for place names differing from English ones. 
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of incorporating all of the Orochen into the military forces outweighed the benefits. The 
prime factor in this calculation was geography. In the early seventeenth century, the 
Orochen were active around the Amur River in what may be considered Northern 
Heilongjiang and on Sakhalin Island. The Qing government established garrisons in 
Southern Heilongjiang. Therefore, it was a matter of convenience to allow the Orochen at 
the region’s literal edge to remain where they were. Collecting tribute from them was 
complicated, and the supervising officials had to take long journeys to and from the 
collection points. Conscripting them would therefore be even more challenging. Another 
possible reason why the Yafahan Orochen were not organized into military units is that 
they were more useful to the Qing government as civilian laborers. They did not receive 
income and rations, and because they could move freely, they could cover a wide range 
of hunting ground and procure more and better furs for tribute.  
 
Nineteenth-Century Blues  
 
 Leaving the Yafahan Orochen out in the open for logistical convenience and 
economic advantage was tenable until the late eighteenth century. From the Yongzheng 
to Daoguang (1820-1850) reigns, citations about the five routes in government 
correspondence indicate that this management strategy was generally effective.25 Periodic 
problems did arise when tribute collection did not fulfill the quantitative or qualitative 
                                                     
25 The major point of contention in Qing-Russian relations during this period was the scope of 
trade, not the positioning of the border. Disputes over the frequency of trading missions and what 
items should be traded had some indirect effect on borderland administrative operations such as 
where Russian traders should enter and exit Qing territory. For the most part, however, 
diplomatic agreements about the eastern border, such as the Treaty of Kiakhta and Treaty of 
Selenge, both ratified in 1727, were about making it clearer by adding more physical markers 
rather than adjusting its location. 
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requirements of the designated quotas, as well as altercations between the Orochen and 
Russians and illegal trade with both Russians and Orochen from Russian territory. But in 
all, no major concerns arose about the viability of their livelihood or loyalty to the Qing. 
But as the number of security threats, whether posed by domestic “bandits” (daozei 盜賊) 
or by Russian soldiers and settlers increased in frequency and diversity, the Qing center 
sought extra manpower to deal with them. Such a strategy was especially critical after the 
1858 Treaty of Aigun, by which the Russian empire gained a large part of the Amur 
River’s north bank and land south of the Outer Xing’an Range (wai Xing’anling 外興安
嶺), changing the shape of the inter-imperial border. Even what was irrefutably Qing 
territory were not entirely secure. Russian attempts to take over outposts (Ch. kalun 卡倫, 
Ma. kalun) and the increasing hardship of stopping illegal movements by Russian settlers 
back and forth across the border undermined the functionality of the Qing border defense 
system. 
 A combination of external and internal factors rocked what had been an otherwise 
steady trend of administrative institutions forming and operating effectively in 
Heilongjiang since the late seventeenth century. The Heilongjiang general’s headquarters, 
originally set up in the “Heilongjiang garrison” at Aigun (Aihun 璦琿) in 1694, was 
moved to Mergen (Moergen 墨爾根) the following year, and then in 1699 to Qiqihar (Ma. 
Čičigar, Ch. Qiqiha’er 齊齊哈爾), where it would stay until the general’s position was 
abolished in 1907. In 1732, the Heilongjiang command expanded with the establishment 
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of two garrisons, Hulun Buir (Hulunbeier 呼倫貝爾) in present-day Inner Mongolia and 
Hulan. The heads of all garrisons, whether garrison lieutenant generals, commandants, or 
military commandants (chengshou wei 城守衛), reported to the Heilongjiang general. 
The number of troops, including officers, in Heilongjiang remained fairly stable, 
decreasing only slightly from 11,617 men stationed in six garrisons during the Qianlong 
reign (1735-1796) to 11,423 in the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), a figure that remained 
more or less the same during the Daoguang and Xianfeng (1850-1861) reigns.26  
  The catalysts of change were both foreign and domestic. In the eighteenth 
century the Qing and Tsarist governments continued to fine tune their shared border, but 
the latter was mainly occupied with economic and social reforms within its domain as 
well as expansion into Central Asia. The Russian imperial center did make some 
overtures to increase its knowledge of Manchuria, such as asking for Qing approval to 
navigate the Amur in 1758.27 But it was only in the early nineteenth century that 
Manchuria became an explicit target of Russian territorial expansion when the more 
extensive policy of strengthening control over Siberia became imperative. The security of 
Heilongjiang was also jeopardized more indirectly by instability in other parts of the 
Qing empire, such as the eruption of the Taiping Rebellion in 1850 which compelled 
comprehensive reassignment of existing military resources.  
 Another set of factors that motivated the Qing government to evaluate its 
administration of Heilongjiang concerned specific problems arising in the region. Clauses 
spelling out punishments for illegal migrants, particularly fugitives, in Qing-Russian 
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treaties were insufficient to deter hunters, trappers, and convicts from traversing the 
border and indeed reflected the severity and frequency of these occurrences.28 As the 
border became more permeable, with individuals and groups moving back and forth 
across it, fortifying its defense became a greater priority for the Qing. Looking for more 
manpower, both in greater numbers and of higher ability, Heilongjiang officials 
reconsidered the Yafahan Orochen’s status.29 They deemed the Yafahan Orochen suitable 
for military duties because they were physically strong and accustomed to harsh natural 
conditions and hard work. The Yafahan Orochen were also well-known for being 
excellent archers and marksmen. They consistently outperformed other Heilongjiang 
tributaries, including the Moringga Orochen, in submitting fur pelts of high quality.30 
 The Yafahan Orochen also incited concern because of the dsyfunctional tribute 
collection system. The anda who were supposed to be responsible for the timely 
collection of tribute from, and the distribution of supplies to, the five Yafahan routes 
often exploited their authority for personal gain. The Qing center was also concerned that 
as the natural supply of fur-bearing animals diminished, the Yafahan would avoid 
submitting tribute and flee to remote areas to evade the anda. Such a possibility had 
troubling political implications. If the Yafahan moved towards the border, they could 
cultivate closer relations with Russians, supplying them with furs, relying on them for 
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Other tributaries’ submissions were usually partially accepted and were judged lower in quality 
than those of the Yafahan Orochen.  
  
19 
19 
subsistence goods, and joining their armed forces either voluntarily or as conscripts. All 
of these actions could affect territorial claims if the Russian state insisted that the 
Yafahan were de facto Russian subjects. 
 
Old Wine in Old Bottles  
 
 These problems came to a head right at the midpoint of the nineteenth century. 
The Xianfeng emperor, whose personal qualities have earned for him criticism for being 
“the weakest ruler the Qing had yet endured”31 was nevertheless on the throne when 
transformative crises were compelling his officials to develop tenable solutions. Yinglong
英隆, the Heilongjiang general when the Xianfeng emperor started his reign, did not 
generate any notable recommendations, but his immediate successor, I’ge 奕格, was 
comparatively proactive. Towards the end of his one-year tenure, I’ge memorialized 
about deferring the tribute from the five routes for one year so they could concentrate on 
defending the territory against the Russian encroachment he had reported several months 
before.32 I’ge rationalized this proposal by stressing the difficulty of moving troops into 
the endangered area from the four closest garrisons and that the Butha troops could not 
handle the additional burden of heightened security alone. He also worried that by going 
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both the lunar imperial and Gregorian calendars. The lunar imperial dates are stated in the 
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to the usual places for hunting sables, both the Yafahan and Moringga Orochen could get 
too close to the Russians crossing the border and going towards the Pacific Ocean in 
boats loaded with livestock, provisions, and military supplies. An Orochen lieutenant 
named Moergenei 莫爾格內 had already been coerced by Russians to provide 
navigational guidance, for which he was duly punished. The responding imperial edict 
debated the efficacy of this preemptory strategy but nevertheless agreed to defer the 
tribute so that the Orochens’ livelihood would not be jeopardized.33 
 This temporary reprieve was not enough to mitigate, much less solve, the 
difficulties in keeping the Orochen away from the Russians and preserving law and order 
in their home area. Išan 奕山, I’ge’s successor, raised similar concerns two years later, 
asking for reinforcements to help existing personnel manage the Yafahan.34 Together 
with the Jilin general Jingchun 景淳, Išan played a key role in monitoring the Russian 
presence in the Amur River valley and receiving Russian emissaries.35 Based on his 
observations, he reasoned that since Russians in Heilongjiang were becoming more 
numerous and building settlements, they would be more likely to encounter the Orochen. 
Since the Orochen were innately rough (fuxing cuguang 賦性粗獷) and did not 
understand moral principles (bu zhi lunli 不知倫理), they would inevitably incite 
conflicts with the Russians. Moreover, as the Orochen were in remote places, officials 
supervising them were on duty for long shifts, and so increasing their number was 
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imperative to prevent disturbances. Since the Treaty of Aigun ceded Qing territory north 
of the Amur River to Russia in the same year, the Xianfeng court fulfilled Išan’s entreaty 
indirectly by approving the addition of 1000 cavalry troops to the Heilongjiang 
command.36  
 As predicted by I’ge and Išan, Russian expansion into Heilongjiang led to ever-
greater troubles. A Russian contingent burned down an outpost in 1859 just at the end of 
Išan’s tenure. His successor Tebčin 特普欽 repaired the wreckage and contemplated the 
greater implications of this arson case.37 Tebčin pleaded to the throne that as the Russians 
intended to occupy the area where the outpost was damaged, the native populations, 
particularly the Yafahan Orochen, Heje, and Fiyaka (Feiyaka 費雅卡), who were 
considered to be brave and fierce, could be the most useful forces to combat the Russians. 
By the same token, Tebčin stressed that they should not be left alone and thus vulnerable 
to Russian conscription for military and other functions. Therefore he recommended that 
they should be brought together to form militias. Tebčin felt that the Yafahan Orochen, 
who roamed around the Amur River basin to hunt for pelts, were especially talented 
marksmen and had a vigorous gait (bulü jiaojie 步履矯捷). He dispatched officials to 
investigate their situation, including two non-Orochen officers who were nevertheless 
familiar with the Orochen language. Based on accumulated knowledge, he believed that 
the Yafahan should be given grain rations so that their livelihood would not be adversely 
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affected and should be assigned to strategic passes after the next round of tribute 
collection.38  
 Although placing the Orochen in strategic passes could alleviate the problem of 
Russians slipping into critical areas, Tebčin acknowledged that the Russians might in fact 
take advantage of the Yafahan leaving their respective home regions by infiltrating and 
also occupying those places.39 He recommended that the Yafahan return to their 
respective routes and move closer to garrisons and that all of their men be counted and 
evaluated for age and fitness. He provided basic figures regarding the number of men in 
each route as well as their usual and ideal positions. The Kumar route, with 1080 men, 
was in an area with a sizeable game population, but for the sake of the members’ security 
and coordinated defense they were to be moved one hundred to two hundred li westward 
on the left bank of the Amur, and live and hunt within three to four hundred li of the 
Kumar River (Kuma’er he 庫瑪爾河) and the Humiken Mountain of the Inner Xing’an 
range (nei Xing’anling). The Birar route, consisting of three to four hundred men, hunted 
in Chele 車勒, which was close to the Russians. Therefore, they should be moved west 
eighty to ninety li towards the Zhan River and be active within three to four hundred li. 
The Tuo route, with 330 men, was also deemed vulnerable to the Russians. This route’s 
men were to hunt within three to four hundred li of the Tuo River and Nuomin River 弩
敏河 /諾敏河. The two smallest routes, the Ali with about 110 men and the Dubukur 
with about sixty men, were closest to the Mergen garrison. Their area of activity was to 
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be three hundred li around the Kuyur (Kuyu’er 庫玉爾河) and Ali Rivers. The imperial 
court approved all of these moves, which drew the Yafahan Orochen inward to the center 
of Heilongjiang.  
 Re-positioning the Orochen was important for maintaining tighter defense. As 
members of the human frontier with the Russians, however, they were both vulnerable 
and susceptible. At stake were not only their physical safety and the integrity of their 
formations as routes, but also their sustenance. Limiting their hunting to certain areas 
meant that their ability to meet the tribute quotas would be affected adversely. Since they 
relied on hunting for food, the Yafahan were especially in need of food assistance. The 
Dagur and Solon anda were generally responsible for distributing grain rations in 
exchange for the tribute pelts. In order to ensure an adequate supply, standard bannermen 
with extra rations were also permitted to sell them directly to the Orochen. However, 
since both the anda and ration-sellers could act in their own interest, they were to be 
strictly monitored and punished for committing even single offenses.40 From the state’s 
perspective, the tribute and manpower for defense also had to be re-assessed in light of 
the information from a survey of households indicating that out of a total of about 1950 
men, excluding the young, elderly, and disabled, there were only five to six hundred able-
bodied men fit for hunting. Therefore, leaving them unsupervised meant that they might 
turn to the Russians for vital necessities. This concern became especially salient after the 
Treaty of Beijing was signed with Russia in November 1860. With the new border to be 
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set at Suifen 綏芬 and along the Ussuri River (Wusuli jiang 烏蘇里江) in the spring of 
the next year, Tebčin and the Jilin general Jingchun had to prepare accordingly. The 
arrangement of Orochen under the control of the Butha commandant seemed sustainable 
for both defense and the continuation of the sable pelt tribute according to existing 
requirements.41  
 Tebčin’s labor bore slow fruit. After strenuous efforts to re-set the Heilongjiang-
Siberia border in 1861, following the treaty, both signatory governments put that area on 
the back burner. It is worth noting that border adjustment work concentrated on 
geographic accuracy rather than the settlement of people. Documentary evidence 
suggests that officials were most absorbed in clarifying which river belonged to which 
empire.42 But with the ascension of the Tongzhi emperor (1862-1874), the Qing center 
started to focus on other aspects of military and political reform, such as developing the 
Office of General Management (zongli yamen), one of the Xianfeng government’s last 
achievements. The rise of leaders like Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang during this 
period in turn fostered bolder measures to augment Qing military capacity. In this regard, 
the common thread linking the Xianfeng and Tongzhi reigns was the expansion of 
regional militias.43 The Tongzhi court increased the number of “trained troops” (lian jun 
練軍) and provisions for such groups in Manchuria, as in other borderlands. But the 
major change that would eventually have a profound effect on Heilongjiang and the other 
areas of Manchuria during this period was the end of the ban on Han migration, enacted 
in 1860 for the section of the Amur River valley abutting the international border, and for 
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other parts later in 1887.44 The gradual influx of Han migrants into Heilongjiang and 
other Manchurian locales was counterpoised by troops dispatched to other regions, such 
as 2000 Heilongjiang soldiers going to Uliyasutai in 1870.45 Until 1875, however, 
officials raised comparatively few concerns about the Yafahan Orochen, perhaps because 
the Russian empire had larger fish to fry. Matsuzato Kimitaka has argued that the “long 
gestational period” between the acquisition of Priamur in 1860 and the establishment of 
the Priamur Governor-Generalship in 1884 was due to the Tsarist government taking a 
circumspect approach to administrative expansion.46 Even while all seemed quiet on its 
southeastern frontier, the Russian imperial center did sow seeds to spread its influence by  
moving the Chinese in the Ussuri River borderland back and forth across the border, 
where they received Russian official encouragement to settle down and marry native 
(Nanai and Korean) women.47 
   
Two Steps Forward, Three Steps Back  
 
 In the first year of the Guangxu reign (1875-1908), the second step of controlling 
the movements and increasing the utility of the Orochen routes took shape. Since their 
work as prime tributaries was considered more important, the Heilongjiang general’s 
yamen faced the dilemma of how to employ them as soldiers while making sure they had 
enough time to hunt. It ordered the Butha garrison lieutenant general cum commandant to 
check and report on the number of able-bodied men between 18 and 45 sui who could be 
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trained and dispatched to quell bandits in Jilin and Heilongjiang.48 The Heilongjiang 
general Fengšen 豐紳 went one step farther by proposing that five hundred of these men 
be chosen, given ammunition, and trained for forty days each year, starting on the first 
day of the third lunar month.49 They would receive cloth and grain rations during the 
training period, but for the rest of the year they should hunt normally and remain in their 
designated areas.  Fengšen believed that the many “innate” traits of the Yafahan made 
them good combatants. Accustomed to hunting in rough mountainous terrain, they had 
robust constitutions, were excellent marksmen, and frightened the Russians. These ideas 
were hardly novel, but even as reiterations of what previous officials had concluded and 
articulated, they became important justifications for enacting the policy of “drawing in” 
the Yafahan.  
 In 1880 the Heilongjiang general Ding’an 定安 expanded the program to five 
hundred more individuals. One thousand participants were organized into units led by 
newly appointed company captains and lieutenants to conduct military drills.50 Each 
training session doubled as a civics seminar. Supervising officials lectured the 
participants about loyalty and admonished them not to cross the inter-imperial border.51 
The training session also became a venue for the Heilongjiang general’s yamen to assess 
the routes’ performance in marksmanship and to distribute bolts of cloth to the 
participants. 
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 These measures to rein in the routes while allowing them to maintain their 
livelihood and nomadic lifestyle proved to be problematic and inadequate to satisfy the 
ultimate objective of administering them more efficiently. Appointing capable officers to 
lead the routes was an ongoing challenge. Towards the end of his tenure, Ding’an worried 
that since many of these tribes were “similar to the Solon” but were unfamiliar with 
military institutional life, they would fare best under Solon commandants until there were 
enough co-ethnic officers to lead them.52 He also felt that it would also be in the state’s 
best interest to assign the Kumar route to the Bordered Yellow Banner, the Birar route to 
the Plain White Banner, and the Dubukur, Tuo, and Ali routes to the Plain Yellow 
Banner.53 Whether Dagur or Solon officers should manage the routes, and whether 
banner officials or Yafahan chiefs should distribute the cloth, became debatable. 
 Taking a major step beyond corralling the Yafahan Orochen periodically, 
Ding’an’s successor Wensioi recommended the establishment of a new garrison between 
the Heilongjiang and Mergen garrisons in 1881. In his proposal for the establishment of 
the Xing’an garrison, Wensioi 文緒 stressed that it was too hard for the Butha command 
to manage the Yafahan. Because there were no dedicated provisions in the Butha 
garrison’s budget that would serve as material incentives for the Yafahan to follow orders, 
the administrative designation was hollow. They had become accustomed to roaming 
freely and were not responding well to the civilizing education to reform their behavior 
and curb their physical movement. Their disobedience had severe political implications 
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since they would run across the border to Russian territory to avoid Qing officials. Efforts 
to teach them how to farm and to give up their nomadic lifestyles for sedentary ones were 
unsuccessful.  
 Personnel problems also factored into Wensioi’s proposition. Route leaders bore 
the additional responsibility of distributing provisions to the Yafahan communities. The 
Heilongjiang general originally chose Dagur officers as anda for this task because they 
were the most efficient administrators. Dagur anda frequently reduced or withheld the 
provisions, taking them for their own profit, and then sought the protection of their co-
ethnic vice-commandant superiors, who in turn were sheltered from punishment by the 
Dagur commandant. Wensioi, upon discovering this problem, recommended that the 
routes be turned over to the Solon commandant and his subordinates. In a memorial to the 
throne describing the Dagur chain of corruption, Wensioi stressed that the Yafahan could 
succumb to “temptation by foreigners” if the issue persisted 54,The Guangxu court duly 
censured the Dagur officials and ordered the division of route leaders’ duties. Manchu 
officials would supervise tribute collection and the prosecution of major crimes, while 
Solon officials would handle census-taking and general administration.  
 The Xing’an garrison, positioned to cover 1600 li of territory with an arsenal and 
a reserves storehouse (gongbei cang 公備倉), seven outposts, and a Guan Di temple, 
became the seventh garrison of Heilongjiang in 1882.55 The physical fort was built in 
Taiping Bay between the Aigun and Mergen garrisons and was central to the five routes’ 
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locations.56 A commandant of garrison lieutenant general rank plus one Manchu 
commandant, one Orochen commandant, and ten vice-commandants (two Manchu and 
eight Orochen) assumed control over the five routes that remained separate from 
Moringga Orochen banner companies. The birth of the garrison was a panacea that would 
also yield long-term benefits for Heilongjiang’s defense. The Yafahan were deemed 
valuable assets because they were already fluent in Chinese and Manchu as well as 
conversant in Russian and familiar with Russian culture. Their skill with weaponry was 
certainly a useful asset, given the Qing’s need for trained troops. Secure employment 
would moreover dissuade the Yafahan from consorting with Russians, since it would free 
them from having to trade with the Russians for their livelihood.  
 Wensioi also proposed that the routes be reorganized and redistributed in the 
banners as part of the garrison formation process.57 The Kumar originally had three 
captains but needed five more (for a total of eight captains) and would be integrated into 
the left wing Bordered Yellow, Bordered White, Plain Blue, and Plain White banners. 
Similarly, the Birar, Ali, Tuo, and Dubukur routes formerly had a total of four captains, 
but now would have four more, for a total of eight, assigned to the right wing Bordered 
Blue, Bordered Red, Plain Red, and Plain Yellow banners. Each company captain would 
lead 58 or 59 men.58 Such an arrangement would facilitate a census of the Yafahan 
population every three years and the selection and drilling of one thousand men for one 
month during every spring and autumn. The tribute quota increased to match the training 
requirement. One thousand pelts would be expected each cycle. The Xing’an garrison 
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would further be responsible for patrolling the mountains, performing customs collection, 
and preventing private sales of tribute furs.  
 Despite the rationality underpinning its design, the conscription policy did not 
facilitate or strengthen Qing authority over the Yafahan as much as intended. Reflecting 
on its eight years of operation, the Heilongjiang general Iktangga 依克唐阿 reported to 
the Grand Council in 1890 that many of the men came to the training sessions were 
already expert marksmen.59 They would, however, only come at their leisure rather than 
according to the schedule. Conscripts were often absent without leave and did not 
respond to orders when making an appearance. Officials tried to round up the Orochen, 
but the troops sent out to do so could not navigate the harsh terrain of Orochen habitats 
successfully. The next year, Iktangga wrote again to report that many of these talented 
recruits were no longer participating, having effectively deserted their units.60 Iktangga 
also submitted a critical report about the failure of Xing’an garrison officials to instill 
discipline into the Yafahan even after ten years, citing the dismal attendance rate at 
training sessions and the salaries languishing in the garrison vault uncollected because 
their would-be recipients did not show up.61 Iktangga also believed that the 100,000 
silver taels dispensed in stipends over the ten years had been wasted because their 
dedication to the empire and the imperial army was still questionable. He proposed 
bolstering their allegiance through material incentives and encouraging them to adopt 
farming as a major occupation. Iktangga cited his own successful experience of visiting 
Orochen settlements and recruiting 200 strong men as part of his public pitch to translate 
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their loyalty and esteem for the state into military service.62 He ordered another officer to 
train the draftees and help their dependents settle down in a nearby area. In his diplomatic 
mission, Iktangga also distributed money and rice to males not chosen for training as well 
as to women and children.  
 The issues and solutions that Iktangga put forth in his memorial were not original 
but were regularly mentioned in official documents about the Yafahan. Qing officials 
believed that the Yafahan were naive and needed to be controlled through appeasement. 
Instead of punishing them severely for their inconsistent participation in garrison duties 
or their disregard for their servitor status, supervising officers often assumed that the 
Yafahan were either irresponsible or simply unable to abide by regulations. To bring 
them into line, these officials recommended moral and cultural education, as would be 
applied to young children. If they learned how to conduct themselves properly and to 
espouse an agricultural, sedentary lifestyle in place of their transient, hunting one, the 
Yafahan would be more disciplined and become highly useful as soldiers. The Qing state 
was also concerned that if these people were not treated with care, they would contribute 
their talents to the Russians. Iktangga urged cautious moves to win over the Yafahan, 
stating that “if we pacify one more soldier’s heart, we gain one more soldier’s 
strength.”63  
 While his impressions just confirmed that old problems had yet to be solved, 
Iktangga made his mark by outlining a four-part strategy to reform Yafahan 
administration in 1894.64 He declared that after three years, “drawing in” was not yet 
effective and that further efforts and changes were necessary. Among the problems 
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identified were that the Yafahan could not communicate well with other bannermen 
because of linguistic barriers, were accustomed to eating raw flesh of birds and beasts 
and wearing animal skins (shi rou yi pi 食肉衣皮), and living in the mountains; if they 
were forced into the banners, they might not like warm clothes and cooked food and 
would also be vulnerable to smallpox. All of these discomforts would likely make them 
recoil and go into hiding, and all efforts to draw them out of these remote areas would be 
for nought.  Pragmatism was, therefore, essential. The previous regulations had to be re-
adjusted according to actual circumstances and matters settled according to local 
conditions. The innate nature of the Yafahan should be a factor in creating mechanisms to 
monitor them. Moreover, capable officials had to be chosen, even if it meant selecting 
talent regardless of rank and ordinary promotion procedures (yong ren yi poge 用人宜破
格).  
 The tribute system, to which the Yafahan had long been the most productive 
contributors, also suffered with the establishment of the garrison. Iktangga asked for the 
tribute to be temporarily deferred for the Xing’an Orochen because of the hardship they 
faced in maintaining their livelihood while hunting in barren mountains.65 The Imperial 
Household Department official Aisin Gioro Fukun 愛新覺羅福錕 and others responded 
that given that the Butha system was established during Wensioi’s time with 1000 troops 
receiving one tael and corporals two taels monthly in exchange for one pelt per year, they 
would not presumptuously change the regulation but would consider deferring it 
temporarily. They checked into the use and purpose of such pelts and found that they 
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were for providing the emperor and empress dowager with clothing and handiwork at the 
empress dowager’s disposal. Their ultimate decision was that the general should still try 
choosing enough pelts and continue paying the tribute, since stopping it would be 
difficult.66  
 
History Lessons  
 
 Iktangga’s resolve to restructure the Xing’an garrison was not enough to sustain it. 
With his departure to lead troops in the first Sino-Japanese War, the Qiqihar garrison 
lieutenant general Zengqi 增祺 became the interim Heilongjiang general. He oversaw the 
dismantling of the Xing’an garrison and the dispersal of the routes to other garrisons. The 
Heilongjiang garrison lieutenant general took over the Kumar companies. Likewise, the 
Tuo companies merged into the Hulun Buir garrison and the Ali and Dubukur companies 
joined the Mergen garrison. In a rare case of bottom-up influence, the Birar route did not 
return to the Butha garrison; the commandant was elevated to garrison lieutenant general 
status but was eventually reassigned to the Heilongjiang (Aigun) garrison. The 
Heilongjiang general’s yamen also implemented the new system of a regiment colonel 
leading each route. In November 1894, Zengqi ordered the trial dispatch of regiment 
colonels from all routes to go into the mountains and carry out measures to corral the 
Yafahan.67  
 The Heilongjiang general’s yamen distributed compensation to each garrison for 
incorporating a route, but maintenance fees were to be paid out of their stipends and 
                                                     
66 GX20.02.07 (March 13, 1894). QGJJ 130501. 
67 GX20.10.12 (November 9, 1894). GHZZ 2088-2. 
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additional benefits were discontinued or reduced, such as the allowances for medicine.68 
New officers were also selected. Some former Orochen captains were not content with 
their displacements and refused to participate in the reorganization. Officials testified that 
regular Orochen troops were also not pleased about the prospect of having non-Orochen 
superiors, emphasizing that such officers were not familiar with the mountain terrain and 
did not understand Orochen culture.69 The Orochen did not want to check their traps 
under such leadership, hindering the fur collection process. Zengqi proposed a slower and 
more gradual transition than the original plan of immediately installing the non-Orochen 
officers. He notified all the garrisons taking in Orochen routes that the company captain 
seals would not be transferred from the incumbents to the new appointees until both 
Orochen officers and troops could be convinced to accept the change. The incumbent 
captains would continue to lead groups into the mountains to check traps until the new 
captains learned how to navigate the roads and became more familiar with Orochen 
social and cultural norms.70  
 Regaining the cooperation of dismissed Orochen officers was also critical. They 
were considered prime candidates for leading followers across the border or for otherwise 
fomenting unrest, which would exacerbate the bandit and Russian incursion crises in the 
region. Zengqi addressed a specific problem caused by the re-organization or elimination 
of the commandant and four vice-commandant positions for Orochen in the Xing’an 
garrison. Without these posts, Orochen officers could not be promoted beyond the level 
                                                     
68 This financial proposal authored by the Grand Council received imperial approval on July 2, 
1894 (GX20.05.29), before the formal dissolution of the Xing’an garrison. HFYB 35. 
69 Qiqihar garrison lieutenant general to various departments. GX21.05.20 (July 12, 1895). QHLD 
2/20. 
70 Qiqihar garrison lieutenant general to various departments. GX21.05.20 (July 12, 1895). QHLD 
2/21. 
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of company captain. Being limited in their career prospects could have dampened their 
enthusiasm and made them feel like they were being treated unfairly. Zengqi 
recommended that a new regiment colonel (xieling 協領) position be established so that 
all Orochen company captains could aspire to ascend the hierarchy.71 
  The appeal of the Yafahan as hardy and effective soldiers carried on after the re-
organization process was considered complete. The Grand Council received a memorial 
from the Heilongjiang general’s yamen asking for general permission to disband some of 
the Orochen companies and to transfer their members to other units because “they are 
familiar with mountain paths, are excellent marksmen, and are tough on deserters, bandits, 
and other criminals.”72 The Heilongjiang general’s yamen thought it would be more 
useful to have the skilled Orochen troops deployed among other units, perhaps serving as 
a backbone to them much as veteran non-commissioned officers would in a Western 
army, than to be concentrated in their own well-trained companies. When the 
commanding officer of the Heilongjiang mines wrote to the Heilongjiang general’s 
yamen about the inefficiency of the mine guards in keeping workers from absconding or 
repelling Russian and Solon bandits, the Heilongjiang general decided that Yafahan 
troops would be fit replacements. Since they were familiar with the mountains, they 
could chase and apprehend fugitive workers. Their well-known proficiency in shooting 
would deter bandits, or at least they could successfully engage intruders in combat.73 The 
mines commander agreed with the plan to replace some of the guards with Yafahan 
                                                     
71 Qiqihar garrison lieutenant general to various departments. GX21.05.20 (July 12, 1895). QHLD 
2/22. 
72 June 18, 1896 (GX22.05.08). QHLD 2/102. 
73 Heilongjiang general to Commanding officer of the mines. GX22.05.28 (July 8, 1896). QHLD 
2/102-3. 
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troops and asked for permission to work with the Aigun garrison lieutenant general about 
selecting potential candidates. The Heilongjiang general’s response emphasized that only 
those Yafahan willing to work should go to the mines. He feared that those employed 
through coercion would become resentful and run away, going as far as Russian territory. 
 The dispersal of the Yafahan did not improve administrative conditions. Some 
problems were short-term and directly related to reform. The Heilongjiang general’s 
yamen submitted an extension request in 1896 explicitly citing the division as the reason 
furs could not be collected on time. The troops were adjusting to their new garrisons 
during the hunting season, and once they were settled in it was no longer the right time to 
hunt.74 Other issues like corruption became endemic and ongoing. After settling stipends 
and other forms of compensation, the Heilongjiang general’s yamen discovered severe 
accounting discrepancies in the Xing’an garrison rolls. While the garrison was in 
operation, only two hundred to six hundred men attended each of the annual training 
sessions. The garrison stocked one thousand bolts of cloth, enough for all expected 
participants, and the official roster indicated that more than nine hundred bolts were 
distributed each time.75 The Heilongjiang general’s yamen launched an investigation in 
1897 to determine which officials had appropriated the bolts that had not been given to 
training attendees. It also discovered that regiment colonels were collecting illegal fees 
for transporting livestock. The incumbent general Enje 恩澤 recommended giving 
administrative stipends to these officials so that the Orochen rank and file could keep 
more of their meager government-distributed provisions.76 
                                                     
74 Heilongjiang general to the Grand Council. GX22.05.16 (June 26, 1896). GHJZ 506.  
75 Heilongjiang general to the Grand Council. GX22.12.06 (January 8, 1897). GHJZ 512.  
76 GX23.04.12 (May 13, 1897). QSL-DZ 404: 276a. 
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 Only in the final decade of Qing rule did the prolonged, multi-stage project of 
increasing control over the Yafahan seem to be successful. By 1899, incidentally the 
same year when the last Heilongjiang garrison at Tungken (Tongken 通肯) was 
established, the “brought in” Yafahan were promptly and adequately submitting tribute.77 
Before his final illness and death that year, Enje memorialized that all measures were 
effectual.78 Similarly, Cheng Dequan 程德全, the last Heilongjiang general, noted in 
January 1905 that according to Gulgu 固魯固, regiment colonel of the Tuo route, his 
charges had been effectively drawn in.79 At the end of that year, Cheng summarized the 
whole process, stressing that the principal reason the Heilongjiang general’s yamen had 
to manage the five routes directly after a long period of Butha administration was their 
poor treatment by the anda. In further finger pointing, Cheng deemed the Xing’an 
garrison to be a failure because the commandants and sub-commandants had been 
incompetent. His criticism extended even to the funds distributed to the regiment colonels 
for the routes’ sustenance, and the fact that when the Yafahan came out of the mountains, 
they pillaged and looted. It was important, he deduced, that the regiment colonels be 
compensated amply so that they would supervise their routes ably, particularly the Kumar 
and Birar that came into most contact with Russians.80  
                                                     
77 GX25.08.20 (September 24, 1899). QGJJ 408004816. 
78 GX25.03.13 (April 22, 1899). JHLZ 7942-7. 
79 GX30.12.09 (January 14, 1905). CJSZ 273, quoting the report of the Hulun Buir garrison 
lieutenant general Isingga依興阿. 
80 GX31.11.07 (December 3, 1905). CJSZ 880. Cheng also emphasized the importance of 
assigning more and better individuals as route officials in the following year. GX32.03.11 (April 
4, 1906). CJSZ 1181-82. 
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Cheng’s ambivalent assessment ultimately did not matter for long-term political 
planning because Heilongjiang underwent a full-scale reform starting in 1905 with the 
elimination of the Butha, Hulan, and Tungken (Tongken) garrisons, the last of the three 
established only six years prior. The Aigun, Mergen, and Hulun Buir garrisons would 
similarly be terminated and converted into new administrative units in 1908. The 
Heilongjiang command had maintained a relatively stable troop headcount, and finances 
during its existence while being subject to the general reductions and austerity measures 
throughout the Qing military system.81 But the Xing’an garrison, like other stopgap 
tactics, was unsustainable. Contemporaneous observers posed various reasons for its 
certain failure, including the shoddy physical edifice and the fact that the anda 
supervising the Yafahan Orochen were appropriating over fifty percent of the tribute 
pelts.82 Garrison officials were therefore already facing an uphill battle to earn the trust 
and cooperation of the Yafahan Orochen populations. That the regional authorities had 
already lost credibility in the eyes of the Orochen continued to be a running theme in 
criticisms of the garrison from the Republican period all the way to the present. Instead of 
drawing the Yafahan Orochen closer, the garrison literally made them hide in the 
woods.83 But besides being wary of Qing officials, the Yafahan Orochen may have had 
other reasons for refusing to comply with institutions like the Xing’an garrison. Xu 
Shichang 徐世昌, writing in the last official year of the Qing dynasty, recognized that the 
Yafahan Orochen needed commodities from Russia such as guns and pelts, and traded 
                                                     
81 From 1684 to 1875, the total number of Heilongjiang personnel, including troops and officers, 
only dropped from 13,000 to 10,000. 
82 HJSL 2/34 and 3/50.  
83 Two of many examples are EZQG 14 and EZJS 47. 
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actively with Russians in a ruble-based economy.84 Russianization was another 
compelling reason to “draw in” the Yafahan Orochen and, concurrently, an explanation 
why the Qing government encountered resistance from the target population. Orochen 
women and children wore Russian-style clothing and adopted Russian names.85 Xu 
furthermore highlighted that the policy towards the Yafahan Orochen was not just about 
enhancing military defense but also counteracting their dependence on Russians, such as 
by establishing schools to combat their illiteracy.86 
 
Conclusion  
 
 The Qing government faced both familiar and new circumstances in the 
nineteenth century when formulating policies towards Heilongjiang and the Yafahan 
Orochen. Quite unlike the seventeenth century, when Manchurian indigenes viewed 
people from Russia as fearsome strangers, contact for trade and other purposes was 
common by the nineteenth century. The Qing government maintained the paternalistic 
attitude of protecting the borderland subjects from Russian exploitation, but in reality it 
was concerned about the consequences of cooperative interaction between Manchurians 
and Russians. Drawing in the Yafahan Orochen was therefore partially a defensive 
measure, but it was also a critical strategy to stem potential ambiguity about where this 
population belonged, physically and politically. By re-organizing the Yafahan Orochen 
                                                     
84 DSZL, Frontier Affairs (bianwu邊務) – Hulun Buir section (Hulunbeier pian), 31/1427.  
85 DSZL, Frontier Affairs – Hulun Buir section, 31/1428. 
86 DSZL, Frontier Affairs (bianwu) – Xingdong section (Xingdong pian), 11/1363. 
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and placing them under the control of garrison officials, the Qing asserted its jurisdiction 
over these people.  
 Conscripting the Yafahan Orochen also enabled the Qing state to mitigate its 
weaknesses in managing physical geography. Continuing to administer the Yafahan 
Orochen only through the tribute system would have meant that they would be roaming 
around along the border without regular and consistent checks. They could not only cause 
trouble by either helping or fighting the Russians, but could also render the land a 
potential hotspot. The Yafahan Orochen were a liability for being active in the very areas 
that the Russians eyed and eventually claimed. The posts of Nikolaevsk, built right above 
the Amur estuary in 1850, and Ust-Zeisk, established at the confluence of the Amur and 
Zeya rivers in 1856 (renamed Blagoveshchensk in 1858), along with the town of 
Khabarovsk, founded in 1860 on the middle Amur, were all near areas where the Yafahan 
Orochen sought items for tribute and their own sustenance. Moreover, as seen in the case 
of Russians stealing Orochen household property and horses near the Huma River as late 
as 1907, co-existence perennially led to crime and other forms of conflict.87 Therefore, 
the imperial center may have reasoned that moving them southward towards the garrisons 
was the only viable way to keep the Yafahan Orochen in line in the face of progressive 
territorial attrition.88   
                                                     
87 A Han Chinese businessman named Tan Bashan 探巴善 and two Orochen men, Zangušan 蒼
古善 and Imeče 依莫車, declared that they were witnesses to this incident of larceny. 
Interrogations were held in Jalinda village (Jalinda tun扎林達屯) and Huma village (Huma tun 
呼瑪爾屯), both in Russia, and the Russian garrison at Heihe 黑河. XT03.06.07 (July 2, 1911). 
HLJS 282. 
88 The Qing state was not entirely passive about maintaining sovereignty over its subjects affected 
by Russian official and informal annexation. The Treaty of Aigun’s first article affirmed that the 
“Manchu inhabitants” (Manzhou ren 滿洲人) of land around the left bank of the Amur River 
  
41 
41 
 Aside from its significance for Heilongjiang frontier administration, drawing in 
the Yafahan Orochen was also consonant with empire-wide trends in military strategy, 
such as tapping into new sources of manpower. The Yafahan Orochen were similar to 
ethnic Han militias in the Qing interior in that they had not previously served in an 
official military capacity but were organized to handle conflicts in their home region. 
However, unlike the Han militias, which the Qing elite hesitated to mobilize because they 
were not considered entirely trustworthy,89 there were no particular stances that the 
Yafahan Orochen should not be conscripted. The particular means applied to the Yafahan 
Orochen also reflected the differences among provinces and provincial-level regions, or 
the lack of unified methods for training soldiers prevalent in the 1860s through 1880s. 
Heilongjiang, which was one of the regions targeted during the second wave of training 
reforms from 1875 to 1883 drew, like other sub-areas of Manchuria, from Eight Banner 
forces rather than from militias or Green Standard troops.90 In that vein, the Yafahan 
Orochen were brought into the Eight Banners system rather than becoming members of a 
new military institution. 
 Rooting out persistent sources of discontent to improve the troops’ morale was 
another characteristic of the Yafahan Orochen case that is comparable with military 
reforms in other parts of Qing territory. Zeng Guofan prioritized increased remuneration 
in assembling the Xiang army from regional and village militias to quell the Taiping 
Kingdom. The monthly stipends were several times what Green Standard troops earned, 
                                                                                                                                                              
ceded to Russia would remain under Qing administration and could not be harassed by their 
Russian neighbors, who would presumably have been doing so on official orders. 
89 CBYW-XF 2700-1. 
90 The first phase was from 1866 to 1873. For the provinces/regions involved in each of the two 
phases and differences in compensation, facilities, and equipment among these areas, see Shi 
2000, 178-80. 
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and were significantly higher than what the recruits could expect to earn as self-employed 
farmers or laborers.91 The Heilongjiang general’s yamen tried to increase the morale and 
ensure the loyalty of the Yafahan Orochen by rooting out routine corruption that had 
diminished the compensation they received for submitting tributes and by offering them 
better opportunities for promotion to higher military ranks. Yet while parallels may be 
drawn with contemporaneous developments, the treatment of the Yafahan Orochen was 
also unlike other general patterns in the late Qing, such as pursuing technological reform. 
The human and material resources utilized for re-organizing the Yafahan Orochen could 
have been invested for other purposes such as re-arming soldiers with better weaponry 
and training them in warfare techniques that would have made them better able to fend 
off Russian movements. Strengthening existing forces or creating entirely new ones 
would both have been in line with the general trajectories of military modernization 
during the Xinzheng (new governance) reform period (1898-1912).92 But the determined 
efforts to organize the Yafahan Orochen into companies and assign them to garrisons are 
understandable, despite the attendant difficulties, because doing so was in line with the 
overall belief that it was better to have (official) troops rather than to employ (non-
official) warriors.93 
 Therefore, rather than signifying weakness or even desperation, employing forces 
like the Yafahan Orochen with accommodations for the fits and starts in their 
incorporation demonstrates that the Qing military system was still evolving as late as the 
nineteenth century. Although the Eight Banners had become a mature branch of the 
                                                     
91 Shi 2003, 41.  
92 Zhao 2003, 103.  
93 TZ07.04.20 (May 12, 1868). QSL-MZ 229: 27a. 
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central government by the mid-eighteenth century,94 perceptions of its subsequent 
“decline,”95 whether measured by diminished resources or unimpressive performance in 
battles with foreign and domestic enemies, may inordinately cloud comprehensive 
assessment of how the Qing center strove to maintain military strength in straitened 
circumstances. Returning to the particulars of the Manchurian borderland, at the turn of 
the twentieth century the Heilongjiang command had thirteen thousand troops. Not all 
were well trained, equipped, or even fed, but their officers tried to mold them into units 
fit for purpose. Dagui 達桂 and Cheng Dequan, the last two Heilongjiang generals, 
hesitated to organize more cavalry units than they were able to. They also tried to 
maximize the distribution and usage of the motley assortment of the old firearms at their 
disposal because there was not enough money to equip forces with new ones.96 
 With such fortitude, it is imaginable that the officials responsible for the Yafahan 
Orochen would have preferred their compliance with the measures that were at least 
theoretically of mutual benefit for the Qing state and the Yafahan Orochen, but the reality 
was that over a century of remote administration had established norms of control that 
resisted change. The Yafahan Orochen resented the burdens of military work imposed on 
them in addition to the taxing tribute requirement that was suspended and reinstated 
intermittently until 1911. The Qing center might have mustered them more efficiently if it 
had exempted them from tribute instead of forcing them to assume dual roles as 
                                                     
94 This assessment is substantiated by the conventional pattern in studies of the Eight Banners to 
concentrate on its development from the Later Jin to the Qianlong reigns, as exemplified by 
Elliott 2001 and Ding 2003. 
95 Some scholars claim that some units were already performing poorly on the front lines of battle 
as early in the mid-seventeenth century, so the definition and appraisal of the Eight Banners’ 
military fitness varies considerably. See Shi 2003, 38. 
96 See Zhao 2003, 104. 
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producers and fighters. The multiple steps in re-organizing the Yafahan Orochen may 
also have been partially attributable to inadequate management capacity. As Ding 
Yizhuang has argued, this cause was not unique to this case but endemic in the 
northeastern command. Officials, whether deployed to Manchuria or chosen from local 
talent, were of relatively low quality, and common official practices were questionable 
during the Kangxi through Qianlong reigns, which may have established problematic 
standards for the rest of the command’s history.97 
 In the grand sum of things, the subject of this case study was at best a partial 
success for the Qing government. Until 1911, officials dealt with Yafahan Orochen 
households and individuals slipping over the border and attempted to repatriate them 
before the Russian government claimed them as subjects. The abiding fear that even the 
Yafahan Orochen staying within Qing territory would cooperate with the Russians seems 
reasonable because trade between the two groups carried on well into the Republican 
period.98 Furthermore, the Yafahan Orochen did not become a solid corps of frontline 
border guards and combatants, despite the positive assessments of their physical strength 
and martial fitness. Even after they were assimilated fully into banner companies, they 
were still considered ancillary members of the official military forces. This is evident in 
official records such as the Draft History of the Qing (Qingshi gao 清史稿), compiled in 
1927. While the Dagur, Solon, and other Manchurian indigenous groups were all 
mentioned in this text as groups incorporated into the Eight Banners, the “Orochen” were 
                                                     
97 Ding 2003, 160-64. 
98 Social history surveys conducted in Orochen communities during the 1950s and 1960s contain 
much information about Russian anda who were trading partners throughout the late Qing and 
into the 1920s and 1930s. See, for example, EMGB 25. 
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described as “local militias” (xiang bing 鄉兵).99 This reference is clearly about the 
Yafahan Orochen because the description of them includes the detail that they were led 
by their clan leaders, not by banner company captains. This distinguishing feature and the 
fact that the Orochen were cited in the same fascicle as ethnic Han militias suggest that 
even though every effort was made to change how they were administered, the Qing 
government retained some reservations about the Yafahan Orochen’s military status. 
 Despite these internal misgivings, the Qing imperial center achieved its ultimate 
goal of holding its political ground in physically contested territory. It correctly 
recognized how important the human frontier was in the game of wielding nominal and 
actual authority. In 1861, as Qing officials were contemplating how to position the 
Yafahan Orochen, Ernst G. Ravenstein, a German-British geographer, observed that in 
the Amur River region, “The Manchus and some amalgamated tribes of Tunguzians are 
all of them soldiers; and, besides this, some of the other tribes are incorporated into a 
kind of militia.”100 He noted the numbers of military forces in Heilongjiang and Jilin and 
compared them to the “militia,” which at 54,000 men greatly dwarfed the 238 officers 
and 10,431 troops in Heilongjiang and 323 officers and 12,852 troops in Jilin.101 
Although he did not mention them explicitly, the context of his description suggests that 
the “militia” referred to armed men who were not in the Eight Banners, such as the 
Yafahan Orochen. In Ravenstein’s view, however, their unofficial status made them no 
                                                     
99 QSG 133/3949. For a comparison of various terms referring to local militias, see Wakeman 
1975. 
100 Ravenstein 1861, 75. R.K.I. Quested, in her general survey of Sino-Russian relations, makes 
the similar observation that the Orochen were part of the small “Manchu forces” that remained in 
the Amur River area, bearing comparatively “primitive” weapons to hold down the fort in both 
literal and figurative senses against both domestic and foreign enemies of the Qing state. See 
Quested 1984, 17. 
101 Ravenstein 1861, 74. 
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less valuable as fighting forces, or at the very least, they contributed to the perception that 
the Qing still maintained a formidable presence around the Amur. In this regard, Qing 
tenacity in solidifying control over the Yafahan Orochen was a fruitful investment. 
Although it was unable to extinguish the flame of Russian expansion into Manchuria, the 
Qing set the appropriate priority of strengthening its control over the region’s people. 
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